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Article
Contracting Around Finality:
Transforming Price v. Neal from Dictate
to Default
Christopher M. Grengst and Edward S. Adamstt
INTRODUCTION
"Arguably the most important and problematic area within
the entire field of negotiable instruments law is the law relat-
ing to forgery, especially the allocation of losses that result
from forgery."' Forgery is central to negotiable instrument law
because a signature typically authenticates the orders and
promises to pay on which the entire system is based.2 Unfortu-
nately, forgery continues to cause substantial losses to Ameri-
can banks and the national economy. 3 "Despite the significance
of this problem, many of the legal doctrines governing forgery
loss allocation remain quite problematic, even after nearly
three centuries of development." 4 To combat the problem of ne-
gotiable instrument fraud, this Article argues that the time-
honored doctrine of finality, as embodied in the case of Price v.
Neal and § 3-418(c) of the Revised Uniform Commercial Code
(RUCC) should be transformed from a rigid, per se dictate into
a default rule. This transformation would constitute a signifi-
t Attorney-Advisor, Federal Trade Commission Office of Policy Plan-
ning. The author wishes to note that the views expressed in this Article are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the FTC or any
of its Commissioners.
- Howard E. Buhse Professor of Finance and Law, University of Minne-
sota Law School. The authors wish to thank Ryan Miske and Adam Speer for
their excellent research assistance.
1. Steven B. Dow, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal in English and American
Forgery Law: A Comparative Analysis, 6. TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 113, 116-17
(1998).
2. Id.
3. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
4. Dow, supra note 1, at 117-18.
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cant change in Anglo-American commercial paper law. The goal
of this transformation is to allow presenters of negotiable drafts
and payor banks to better allocate the losses of forgery to the
party who is most willing to bear that burden. This ability to
allocate losses, in turn, is designed to reduce the costs of for-
gery and improve the efficiency of the American commercial
paper system.
I. THE PROBLEM OF FORGERY
The autobiography of Frank Abagnale-perhaps the most
notorious forger in modern American history and subject of the
movie Catch Me If You Can starring Leonardo DiCaprio-
vividly illustrates the process and potential ease of forging a
negotiable instrument,5 such as a draft6 check. 7 Abagnale de-
scribes the process of forging a check:
5. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (2003):
Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), "negotiable instru-
ment" means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount
of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the
promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first
comes into possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person
promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the pay-
ment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertak-
ing or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure pay-
ment, (ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment
or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii) a waiver of the benefit of
any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.
Id. "'Promise' means a written undertaking to pay money signed by the person
undertaking to pay. An acknowledgement of an obligation by the obligor is not
a promise unless the obligor also undertakes to pay the obligation." Id. § 3-
103(a)(12). Section 3-103(a)(8) states:
"Order" means a written instruction to pay money signed by the per-
son giving the instruction. The instruction may be addressed to any
person, including the person giving the instruction, or to one or more
persons jointly or in the alternative but not in succession. An authori-
zation to pay is not an order unless the person authorized to pay is
also instructed to pay.
Id. § 3-103(a)(12).
6. See id. § 3-104(e) ("An instrument is a 'note' if it is a promise and is a
'draft' if it is an order. If an instrument falls within the definition of both 'note'
and 'draft,' a person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as ei-
ther.").
7. See id. § 3-104(o ("'Check' means (i) a draft, other than a documentary
draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or (ii) a cashier's check or
teller's check. An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its
face by another term, such as 'money order."').
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[I] needed a sweeter type of check... Like a Pan Am payroll check...
I obtained a book of blank counter checks from a stationary store... I
then rented an IBM electric typewriter with several different typeface
spheres, including script, and some extra ribbon cartridges in various
carbon densities. I located a hobby shop that handled models of Pan
Am's jets and bought several kits in the smaller sizes. I made a final
stop at an art store and purchased a quantity of press-on magnetic-
tape numerals and letters... I took one of the blank counter checks
and across the top affixed a PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS decal
from one of the kits ... [I] typed in the words "EXPENSE CHECK". . . I
made myself, "Frank Williams," the payee, of course, in the amount of
$568.70, a sum that seemed reasonable to me. In the lower left-hand
corner I typed in "CHASE MANHATTAN BANK"... [I] laid down a series
of numbers with magnetic tape... I drove to the nearest bank [and
asked the teller to] cash this check.8
Four parties are involved in any payment on a draft: (1)
the presenter 9 of the draft; (2) the depositary bank10 that first
takes the draft; (3) the payor bank that pays on the draft;12
and (4) the drawer or account holder.13 Potentially, the payor
bank and the depositary bank could be the same entity if the
presenter and the account holder use the same bank, or if the
presenter simply happens to attempt to present the instrument
directly to the payor bank. Usually, however, the payor and de-
positary banks will be different institutions.
Problems relating to the allocation of loss from a forged
draft occur when a party presents 14 a forged or altered 15 check 16
8. FRANK ABAGNALE, CATCH ME IF YOU CAN 118-20 (Broadway Books
2000) (1980).
9. Abagnale in the above example.
10. The bank where Abagnale took the check to have it cashed in the
above example. See U.C.C. § 4-105(2) ("'Depositary bank' means the first bank
to take an item even though it is also the payor bank, unless the item is pre-
sented for immediate payment over the counter.").
11. See id. § 3-104(e).
12. See id. § 4-105(3) ("'Payor bank' means a bank that is the drawee of a
draft.").
13. Pan Am is the account holder in the above example. See id. § 4-
104(a)(1) ("'Account' means any deposit or credit account with a bank . .
14. U.C.C. § 3-501(a) defines "presentment":
"Presentment" means a demand made by or on behalf of a person
entitled to enforce an instrument (i) to pay the instrument made to
the drawee or a party obliged to pay the instrument or, in the case of
a note or accepted draft payable at a bank, or (ii) to accept a draft
made to the drawee.
Id.; see also id. § 3-501(b)(1)-(4).
15. Id. § 3-407(a) ("'Alteration' means (i) an unauthorized change in an
instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party, or
(ii) an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an in-
complete instrument relating to the obligation of a party.").
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or other draft to a bank for payment. 17 Presentment, as in the
example above, can be made to a bank either directly or, as is
often the case in modern times, through an established check
collection system. Upon presentment by a presenter, the de-
positary bank forwards the draft through a collection system to
the payor bank. If the payor bank, to which the instrument is
presented, does not detect the forgery, it will typically immedi-
ately pay the amount of the item18 to the presenting party and
accept 19 the item.
The check is then routed through a check collection system
to the payor bank, which holds the relevant account. The payor
bank will usually charge the account of the customer 20 who is
the account holder 2' whom the forgery is attributed to, ostensi-
bly its drawer, 22 for the amount of the item.
When the payor bank forwards funds to cover the check to
the depositary bank, the payor bank withdraws money from the
account of its account holder. Once the account holder discovers
the loss, the presenter is long gone and recovery of the funds is
unlikely. Thus, the forgery is complete and the problem of allo-
cating the burden of draft forgery detection-and the losses
therefrom-is introduced. At this point, the parties seek their
attorneys to decide who bears the burden of the forgery.
The Anglo-American laws governing commercial paper, in-
cluding the laws of negotiable instruments, are rooted in four-
16. Id. § 3-104(f) ("'Check' means (i) a draft, other than a documentary
draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or (ii) a cashier's check or
teller's check. An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its
face by another term, such as 'money order."'); see also id. § 3-104(g) (defining
"cashier's check"); id. § 3-104(h) (defining "teller's check"); id. § 3-104(i) (defin-
ing "traveler's check").
17. See id. § 3-602(a)-(e); Dow, supra note 1, at 119-20.
18. U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(9) ("'Item' means an instrument or a promise or or-
der to pay money handled by a bank for collection or payment. The term does
not include a payment order governed by Article 4A or a credit or debit card
slip.").
19. See id. § 3-103(a). "'Acceptor' means a drawee who has accepted a
draft." Id. § 3-103(a)(1).
20. Id. § 4-104(a)(5) ("'Customer' means a person having an account with
a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items, including a bank that
maintains an account at another bank.").
21. For purposes of clarity, this Article will refer to a "customer" as de-
fined in U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(5) as an "account holder" to differentiate a code-
defined "customer" from an ordinary consumer of bank services.
22. Id. § 3-103(a)(5) ("'Drawer' means a person who signs or is identified
in a draft as a person ordering payment.").
166 [89:163
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teenth century England.23 There, the negotiable instruments
doctrines evolved so that, by the second half of the seventeenth
century,24 "[a]t common law, mistaken payments could some-
times be recovered through an action for money had and re-
ceived, a form of indebitatus assumpsit."25 This equitable doc-
trine was repudiated by English judges, but was later revived
by the House of Lords in 1943.26 In the meantime, though, the
doctrine created in the case of Price v. Nea 27 limited restitution
by limiting a payor bank's 28 ability to recover on a forged
drawer's signature, and "greatly unsettled"29 the allocation of
losses from forged instruments. Although the doctrine of Price
v. Neal has been steadily eroded in England, this rule, in con-
trast, was quickly incorporated into the American commercial
paper law system, where it remains an essential fixture.
Despite the fact that, under the doctrine of Price v. Neal,
payor banks have an economic incentive to prevent forgery,
losses to the American economy resulting solely from forged
checks were estimated at an annual $60 million-$1 billion two
decades ago.30 These losses appear only to have continued to
grow. 31 In 1995 the Federal Reserve estimated banking losses
from check fraud, including forgeries, at $475-$875 million,
annually. 32 The Federal Reserve estimated the resulting an-
23. See Dow, supra note 1, at 114.
24. Id. at 121.
25. Steven B. Dow, Restitution of Payments on Cheques with Forged
Drawers' Signatures: Loss Allocation Under English Law, 4 RESTITUTION L.
REV. 27, 28 (1996).
Beginning in the early sixteenth century, assumpsit, which is the
Latin word for undertaking, developed into an action to enforce bar-
gained-for promises. It was first limited to express promises, but by
the early seventeenth century, assumpsit would lie in the case of a
promise implied (in fact) from the conduct of the parties.
Dow, supra note 1, at 122 n.27 (citations omitted).
26. Dow, supra note 1, at 123.
27. 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
28. See U.C.C. § 4-105(1) (2003) ("'Bank' means a person engaged in the
business of banking, including a savings bank, savings and loan association,
credit union, or trust company."); see also id. § 4-105(3) ("'Payor bank' means a
bank that is the drawee of a draft.").
29. Dow, supra note 1, at 125.
30. Id. at 117; Steven B. Dow & Nan S. Ellis, The Proposed Uniform New
Payments Code: Allocation of Losses Resulting from Forged Drawers' Signa-
tures, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 399, 400 (1985).
31. Dow, supra note 1, at 117.
32. Id. See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON FUNDS AVAILABILITY SCHEDULES AND CHECK
FRAUD AT DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 5-7 (1996), available at http://www.
2004]
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nual losses to the national economy as a whole at $10-$60 bil-
lion. 33
II. PRICE V. NEAL AND ITS AMERICAN PROGENY
A. PRICE V. NEAL
1. The Case of Price v. Neal
The 1762 case of Price v. Neal,3 4 decided in the King's
Bench of England and delivered by Lord Mansfield, is as cele-
brated as any other commercial paper case in Anglo-American
legal history.
The case features five important individuals. Benjamin
Sutton had deposited money with one John Price. Thus, Price is
the drawee.3 5 Sutton, then, is the account holder here, who
would otherwise have been a drawer if he had drafted the bills
himself.3 6 Edward Neale is the presenter who took the bill from
Rogers Ruding, an indorser.3 7 Lee is the forger who signed Sut-
ton's name to the bill of exchange.3 8
Price paid out on one of the bills when it was due but with-
out acceptance. 39 The other bill was properly accepted, and
Price paid it when it matured. 40 The drawer's handwriting,
however, was a forgery.4 1 Once Price discovered the forgery, he
brought an action as plaintiff against defendant Neale to re-
cover the money that he paid. 42
The first bill in question was drawn as:
Leicester, 22d November 1760. Sir, six weeks after date pay Mr.
Rogers Ruding or order forty pounds, value received for Mr. Thomas
Ploughfor; as advised by, sir, your humble servant Benjamin Sutton.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/chkfraud.pdf (last visited Sept. 1,
2004) (discussing the losses suffered to the banking industry from check fraud
and possible solutions).
33. Dow, supra note 1, at 117. See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 32, at 5-7.
34. 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
35. See id.; see also U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(8) (2003) ("'Drawee' means a person
ordered in a draft to make payment.").
36. See Price, 97 Eng. Rep. at 871.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
[89:163
TRANSFORMING PRICE V. NEAL
To Mr. John Price in Bush-Lane Cannon-Street, London; [indorsed
by] R. Ruding, Anthony Topham, Hammond and Laroche. Received
the contents, James Watson and Son: witness Edward Neale.43
"[T]his bill was indorsed to the defendant" Neale "for a
valuable consideration."44 Neale properly gave notice of the bill
to Price on its due date. Price then sent his servant to take the
bill from Neale. 45
Another bill was drawn as follows:
Leicester, 1st February 1761. Sir, six weeks after date pay Mr. Rogers
Ruding or order forty pounds, value received for Mr. Thomas Plough-
for; as advised by, sir, your humble servant Benjamin Sutton. To Mr.
John Price in Bush-Lane, Cannon-Street, London.... [Indorsed by] R.
Ruding, Thomas Watson and Son. Witness for Smith, Right and Co...
Accepted [by] John Price. 46
The second bill was indorsed to defendant Neale for valu-
able consideration and left at his bankers for payment.47 This
bill was paid to the order of Price, and it was also taken.48
A significant amount of time passed after Price paid the
bills of exchange before he discovered that they were forged.49
Subsequently, Price discovered that "[b]oth these bills were
forged by one Lee, who has been since hanged for forgery,"50 as
was the custom in England at that time. Despite this skulldug-
gery, the King's Bench of England held that the "defendant
Neale acted innocently and bona fide, without the least privity
or suspicion of the said forgeries or of either of them; and paid
the whole value of those bills."51
Thus, for the King's Bench the issue was "[w]hether the
plaintiff.. . can recover back, from the defendant, the money
he paid on the said bills, or either of them."5 2 Plaintiff Price ar-
gued that he ought to recover his money from Neale because "it
was paid by him by mistake only," while Price was acting under
the assumption that the bills were genuine. 53 Defendant Neale
argued that Plaintiff Price was not entitled to recover money
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
2004]
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back. 54 Neale insisted that the burden should fall "to the negli-
gence of the plaintiff' who should have endeavored to find out
"whether the bill was really drawn upon him by Sutton, or
not."55
The King's Bench reiterated Neale's lack of fraud and
payment of value for the bills as important factors in holding in
his favor.56 Presaging the American Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), and its revision, it then laid down its time-honored rule:
"[l]t can never be thought unconscientious in the defendant, to
retain this money, when he has once received it upon a bill of
exchange indorsed to him for a fair and valuable consideration,
which he had bona fide paid, without the least privity or suspi-
cion of any forgery."57 The King's Bench added, "it was not in-
cumbent upon the defendant, to inquire into it." s
Tying its rule together with rationale, the court expanded:
Here was notice given by the defendant to the plaintiff of a bill drawn
upon him: and he sends his servant to pay it and take it up. The other
bill, he actually accepts; after which acceptance, the defendant inno-
cently and bona fide discounts it. The plaintiff lies by, for a consider-
able time after he has paid these bills; and then found out "that they
were forged:" and the forger comes to be hanged. He made no objec-
tion to them, at the time of paying them. Whatever neglect there was,
was on his side. The defendant had actual encouragement from the
plaintiff himself, for negotiating the second bill, from the plaintiffs
having without any scruple or hesitation paid the first: and he paid
the whole value, bona fide. It is a misfortune which has happened
without the defendant's fault or neglect. [Even i]f there was no ne-
glect in the plaintiff, yet there is no reason to throw off the loss from
one innocent man upon another innocent man... [I]f there was any
fault or negligence in any one, it certainly was in the plaintiff, and not
in the defendant. 59
With that, the King's Bench entered judgment for Neale.6 0
2. Historical Justification
The most cited historical justification for the result of Price
v. Neal is that Price was-or should have been-in a superior
position to detect the forgery.61 Neale took the forged note
54. Id. at 872.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. This justification is prevalent in American courts that relied on the
[89:163
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without fault and paid value. 62 He had no reason to believe that
the note was a forgery and could not be expected to make such
an examination. 63 Presumably, according to the King's Bench,
if Price would have taken the time to compare the forged bills
with the actual signature of the true drawer and account holder
Sutton, Price would have discovered the fact that the bills were
unauthorized, and the forgery would have become readily ap-
parent to him. 64 Therefore, Price, as a drawee, was in the best
position to prevent the forgery. If he accepted or paid on an in-
strument bearing a forged signature of one of his account hold-
ers, then he is bound by that acceptance. 65 As a result, a
drawee, like Price, cannot recover payment from a person who
takes without fault and for value. Thus, the holding provides a
rule of strict liability for the drawee.66 Even if Price had en-
deavored to make such a comparison, but had reasonably failed
to detect the forgery, the doctrine would still foreclose recov-
ery.67
Another common, and related, justification for the holding
of Price v. Neal is that the decision supports the policy of final-
ity in commercial transactions. 68 Commonly, the holding of
Price v. Neal is referred to as the "finality rule."6 9 Under the fi-
nality rule, a payor or acceptor who pays or accepts an instru-
ment bearing a forged drawer's signature is bound by that ac-
ceptance. 70 Essentially, certainty is obtained because the
process of collecting drafts finally comes to a definite end, lay-
Price v. Neal doctrine. See Bank of the United States v. Bank of Ga., 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 333, 349 (1825); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Am. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1487, 1495 (9th Cir. 1986); Bank of Glen Burnie v. Loyola Fed.
Sav. Bank, 648 A.2d 453, 455 (Md. 1994); see also Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 405 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Reaffirming Price v. Neal in the final
payment rule of § 3-418, the [U.C.C.] drafters recognized that the case's ap-
praisal of relative opportunity to scrutinize drawer signatures was somewhat
unrealistic [but] they nevertheless insisted that its conclusion survives.").
62. Price, 97 Eng. Rep. at 871.
63. See id.
64. See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANKING 347-
48 (1995).
65. See id.
66. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE ET AL., PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND CREDIT
INSTRUMENTS 343 (1996).
67. See HAWKLAND, supra note 64, at 348.
68. See 3 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 291 (1978).
69. See Dow, supra note 1, at 147.
70. See PALMER, supra note 68, at 290-91.
20041
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ing the liability on the drawee.7 1 Such finality encourages the
free transfer of commercial paper.
For some observers, though, these rationales for the deci-
sion remain "problematic."72 According to these commentators,
"By failing to make clear the justification of the decision and, at
the same time, suggesting an array of potentially conflicting
possibilities, Lord Mansfield invited confusion and conflict over
the doctrine."73 Despite the apparent confusion, "it is clear that
the Price doctrine was well-established by 1829" in English
law.74 It was not, however, extended to forged indorsements or
material alterations during the nineteenth century in Great
Britain.75
B. AMERICAN PROGENY
1. Pre-Uniform Commercial Code
Price v. Neal was adopted wholeheartedly in the nine-
teenth century in almost all American jurisdictions in commer-
cial paper cases.7 6 This ubiquity held well into the twentieth
71. Steven B. Dow & Nan S. Ellis, The Payor Bank's Right to Recover Mis-
taken Payments: Survival of Common Law Restitution Under Proposed Revi-
sions to Uniform Commercial Code Articles 3 and 4, 65 IND. L.J. 779, 789 n.45
(1990) ("Promoting certainty in commercial transactions requires an end to the
process of check collections at some point.").
72. Dow, supra note 1, at 129.
73. See, e.g., id. at 129-30. For more than half a century after Price v.
Neal, courts continued to question the justification for the rule in the case.
See, e.g., Smith v. Mercer, 128 Eng. Rep. 961, 964 (P.C. 1815) (Chambre, J.,
dissenting) ("A great part of the doctrine of Price v. Neal seems ... to be
wholly repudiated by the Court.").
74. Dow, supra note 1, at 133.
75. Id. at 134 (citing Robinson v. Yarrow, 129 Eng. Rep. 183 (C.P. 1817)
(for forged indorsements) and Jones v. Ride, 128 Eng. Rep. 779 (C.P. 1814) (for
material alterations)).
76. Dow, supra note 1, at 134. See, e.g., Bank of the United States v. Bank
of Ga., 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 333, 349 (1825). After a lengthy summary of Price
v. Neal, the Supreme Court said, "the case of Price v. Neal has never since
been departed from; and.., it has had the uniform support of the court, and
has been deemed a satisfactory authority." Id. at 349-50; see also Cooke v.
United States, 91 U.S. 389 (1875). In Cooke, the Court explained, justifying
the rule:
It is, undoubtedly, also true, as a general rule of commercial law,
that where one accepts forged paper purporting to be his own, and
pays it to a holder for value, he cannot recall the payment. The opera-
tive fact in this rule is the acceptance, or more properly, perhaps, the
adoption, of the paper as genuine by its apparent maker. Often the
bare receipt of the paper accompanied by payment is equivalent to an
[89:163
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century.7 7 Like Price v. Neal, however, the prohibition on a
drawee's right to recover was generally limited to holders who
paid for value, acted in good faith, and were not negligent.
7 8
"[T]hese restrictions were no different from.., the early nine-
teenth century English cases" or from Price v. Neal itself.
7 9
Early American courts were reluctant to expand the doctrine
beyond the circumstances that gave rise to Price v. Neal.
80
adoption within the meaning of the rule; because, as every man is
presumed to know his own signature, and ought to detect its forgery
by simple inspection, the examination which he can give when the
demand upon him is made is all that the law considers necessary for
his protection. He must repudiate as soon as he ought to have discov-
ered the forgery, otherwise he will be regarded as accepting the pa-
per. Unnecessary delay under such circumstances is unreasonable;
and unreasonable delay is negligence, which throws the burden of the
loss upon him who is guilty of it, rather than upon one who is not. The
rule is thus well stated in Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank, 17 Mass.
[33, 45 (1820)]: "The party receiving such notes must examine them
as soon as he has opportunity, and return them immediately: if he
does not, he is negligent; and negligence will defeat his action."
Id. at 396-97.
77. See, e.g., Commercial & Sav. Bank Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 120
N.E. 670, 672 (Ind. App. Ct. 1918). In 1918, the Indiana Court of Appeals held
that:
Where a check purporting to have been drawn by one of [the payor
bank's] depositors is presented to the bank by a bona fide holder
thereof for value, and is paid by the bank, the latter cannot compel
such holder to whom payment has been so made to repay the amount
to it, if it subsequently discovers the check to have been forged.
Id. In 1920, the Supreme Court again favorably cited Price v. Neal's doctrine of
finality, incorporating directly much of Bank of the United States v. Bank of
Georgia. United States v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 252 U.S. 485, 494 (1920).
78. Dow, supra note 1, at 135-36; see Bank of Ga., 23 U.S. at 348 ("[N]o
recovery could be had, unless it be against conscience for the defendant to re-
tain it, and that it could not be affirmed, that it was unconscientious for the
defendant to retain it, he having paid a fair and valuable consideration for the
bills, said 'Here was no fraud, no wrong."' (internal citation omitted)); United
States v. Nat'l Exch. Bank, 214 U.S. 302, 311 (1909) (applying Bank of Ga., 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 333); Hoffman v. Bank of Milwaukee, 79 U.S. 181, 192
(1870)); see also Leather Mfrs. Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96, 109 (1886).
79. Dow, supra note 1, at 136.
80. See Dow & Ellis, supra note 71, at 791 n.51 (stating that much like
English courts, American courts refused to extend Price v. Neal in other cases
that involved mistaken payment, including the payment of a draft containing
a forged indorsement or a material alteration); see also Nat'l Metro. Bank v.
United States, 323 U.S. 454, 458 (1945) (affirming the "general rule under
which one who presents and collects a valid commercial instrument with a
forged [i]ndorsement can be compelled to repay"); ABN Amro Bank N.V. v.
United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 126, 129 (1995). The Court of Claims noted:
The common law evolved differently for checks involving solely
forged indorsements. In such cases, rather than placing responsibility
for the loss with the [payor] bank, the courts placed liability on the
2004]
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However, some limited exceptions were made for cases of mis-
taken payment of insufficient funds81 and no-account checks.8 2
The 1896 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) did
not explicitly recognize the rule of Price v. Neal.8 3 This omission
is, perhaps, due to the fact that almost the entirety of the NIL
was taken "paragraph by paragraph from the English Bills of
Exchange Act of 1882," which was characterized by a similar
omission.8 4 Nonetheless, the doctrine of finality became and
remained "firmly established" and "nearly universal" in Ameri-
can commercial paper law before the UCC.s 5
2. Original Uniform Commercial Code
The holding of Price v. Neal was adopted into the original
UCC, and remained largely unaffected until the adoption of the
RUCC.86 The drafters cited as the justifications for adopting
depositary bank. Although the allocation of loss for the two types of
forgery cases is different, the reasoning that underlies the results is
essentially the same. In Price and its progeny, the courts allocated the
loss to the [payor] bank because the [payor] bank is in a better posi-
tion than the depositary bank to detect a forgery of the drawer's sig-
nature. Analogously, for forged indorsements, the depositary bank
typically is in a better position than the [payor] bank to detect a for-
gery because the depositary bank is either familiar with the indorser's
signature or in a position to secure proof of the indorser's identity.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
81. See Dow & Ellis, supra note 71, at 791 n.51 (discussing cases of mis-
taken payment of insufficient funds).
82. Id. at 792 n.52 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of
the doctrine in cases of insufficient funds and no-account checks); see Dow, su-
pra note 1, at 136-37. In the case of no-account checks, "payment was final
and could not be recovered by the bank so long as the holder was in good faith,
not negligent, and had taken the item for value." Id. at 137.
83. Dow, supra note 1, at 141.
84. Id. The NIL "was closely modeled on the British Bills of Exchange Act
of 1882 .... " Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, Introduction to Sympo-
sium, Revised U.C.C. Articles 3 & 4 and New Article 4A, 42 ALA. L. REV. 373,
385 (1991).
85. Dow, supra note 1, at 144-45.
86. U.C.C. § 3-418 cmts. 1-2 (1978) state:
[U.C.C. § 3-418] follows the rule of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354
(1762), under which a drawee who accepts or pays an instrument on
which the signature of the drawer is forged is bound on his acceptance
and cannot recover back his payment. Although the original Act is si-
lent as to payment, the common law rule has been applied to it by all
but a very few jurisdictions .... [U.C.C. § 3-418] follows the decisions
under the original Act applying the rule of Price v. Neal to the pay-
ment of overdrafts, or any other payment made in error as to the
state of the drawer's account. The same argument for finality applies,
with the additional reason that the drawee is responsible for knowing
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the doctrine both the finality rule and the concept that the
drawee is in a superior position to detect the forgery.
8 7
Section 3-418 of the original UCC read, in relevant part,
''payment or acceptance of any instrument is final in favor of a
holder in due course, or a person who has in good faith changed
his position in reliance on the payment."88 The drafters, how-
ever, pointed out that "[tihe rule as stated in the section is not
limited to drawees, but applies equally to the maker of a note
or to any other party who pays an instrument."8 9 Notably, § 3-
418 included the equivalent Price v. Neal requirements of "good
faith"90 and "takes... for value," incorporated through § 3-
302's definition of "holder in due course."91 Moreover, § 3-418
the state of the account before he accepts or pays.
Id.; Dow, supra note 1, at 145-46; see, e.g., N. Trust Co. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 582 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying U.C.C. § 3-418 and
holding that when an indorser was holder in due course, the drawee could not
recover the monies or its proceeds from the forged check because the final
payment rule barred the action), affd 748 F.2d 803 (1984) (per curium).
87. U.C.C. § 3-418 cmt. 1 (1978). Of these two justifications, the drafters
found that the benefits of finality were more important and realistic:
The traditional justification for the result is that the drawee is in a
superior position to detect a forgery because he has the maker's sig-
nature and is expected to know and compare it; a less fictional ration-
alization is that it is highly desirable to end the transaction on an in-
strument when it is paid rather than reopen and upset a series of
commercial transactions at a later date when the forgery is discov-
ered.
Id.
88. Id. § 3-418.
89. Id. § 3-418 cmt. 1.
90. Id. § 3-418.
91. Id. § 3-302. The original U.C.C. definition of "holder in due course"
read in relevant part:
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
Id. U.C.C. § 3-418 cmt. 3 states:
[U.C.C. § 3-418 makes] payment or acceptance final only in favor
of a holder in due course, or a transferee who has the rights of a
holder in due course under the shelter principle. If no value has been
given for the instrument the holder loses nothing by the recovery of
the payment or the avoidance of the acceptance, and is not entitled to
profit at the expense of the drawee; and if he has given only an execu-
tory promise or credit he is not compelled to perform it after the for-
gery or other reason for recovery is discovered. If he has taken the in-
strument in bad faith or with notice he has no equities as against the
drawee.
Id. § 3-418 cmt. 3; see also, e.g., G.F.D. Enters., Inc. v. Nye, 525 N.E.2d 10, 11
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allowed recovery "for breach of warranty on presentment" 92 un-
der § 3-417, 93 parallel to the common law.94
The rule allowing a drawee to recover based on negligence
by the presenter was also adopted via the good faith require-
ment.9 5 In a nod to the common law, the drafters maintained
Price v. Neal "in essentially its pre-Code form,"96 allowing re-
covery for insufficient funds and no-account items. 97 Up to the
creation of the RUCC, the principle "obstacle" a plaintiff-
drawee had to clear to recover against a presenter remained
"the final payment rule which has its roots in the 18th century
case of Price v. Neal.
98
3. Revised Uniform Commercial Code
The RUCC made "relatively minor"99 changes to the UCC
and the Price v. Neal doctrine. While RUCC § 3-418(a) and (b)
appear to give the drawee hope of recovering funds paid over a
forged drawer's signature, 100 RUCC § 3-418(c) quickly steals
this optimism for recovery from the drawee. 10 1
(Ohio 1988) (applying U.C.C. § 3-418 and holding, as a result of the final pay-
ment rule, the payment of a negotiable instrument by the "payor bank is final"
when the payment is made in favor of a holder in due course, rendering the
"payor bank primarily liable on the instrument").
92. U.C.C. § 3-418 (1978). The warranty on presentment included, in most
cases, that the person obtaining good faith payment or acceptance had "no
knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer [was] unauthorized," Id.
§ 3-417(1)(b). This provision was carried into the RUCC. See U.C.C. § 3-417
(2003).
93. U.C.C. § 3-418 (1978).
94. Dow, supra note 1, at 147-48.
95. Id. at 148.
96. Id. at 151.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Payroll Check Cashing v. New Palestine Bank, 401 N.E.2d
752 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). In this case, the Indiana Court of Appeals reiterated
the rationale of Price v. Neal. Id. at 755. New Palestine Bank (NPB) inspected
and paid three checks, but was subsequently informed that they were forger-
ies. Id. at 754. NPB then commenced an action against Payroll Check Cashing
to recover. Id. The court recounted the finality rule and applied it to the case
at hand. Id. at 755. The court noted that: "[tihe rule of Price v. Neal . . . is
maintained in the Code .... [P]ayment is final in favor of a holder in due
course or a person who has in good faith changed his position in reliance on
the payment." Id. "[Price v. Neal] held that a drawee who pays an instrument
bearing a forged drawer's signature is bound on his acceptance and cannot re-
cover back his payment." Id.
99. Dow, supra note 1, at 154.
100. See U.C.C. § 3-418(a)-(b) (2003).
101. See id. § 3-418(c).
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RUCC § 3-418(a) codifies the drawee's right to recover for
payment on an instrument if the drawee mistakenly believed
that a stop payment order 102 had not been issued or if a forged
drawer's signature appeared on the draft.103 Further, § 3-418(b)
codifies the right of a drawee to recover payment or revoke ac-
ceptance for other mistaken payments, like insufficient funds,
under the common law of mistake and restitution.10 4 The rule
of Price v. Neal, however, is itself incorporated in § 3-418(c).10 5
It reads, in relevant part, "[t]he remedies provided by subsec-
tion (a) or (b) may not be asserted against a person who took
the instrument in good faith and for value or who in good faith
changed position in reliance on the payment or acceptance." 10 6
Thus, in most circumstances, § 3-418(c) swallows § 3-418(a) and
(b).107
Moreover, under the RUCC, the drawer still provides cer-
tain presentment warranties to the drawee.1 0o When the pre-
102. See id. § 4-403.
103. Id. § 3-418(a) reads:
Except as provided in (c), if the drawee of a draft pays or accepts
the draft and the drawee acted on the mistaken belief that (i) pay-
ment of the draft had not been stopped pursuant to Section 4-403 or
(ii) the signature of the drawer of the draft was authorized, the
drawee may recover the amount of the draft from the person to whom
or for whose benefit payment was made or, in the case of acceptance,
may revoke the acceptance. Rights of the drawee under this subsec-
tion are not affected by failure of the drawee to exercise ordinary care
in paying or accepting the draft.
Id.
104. Id. § 3-418(b) reads:
Except as provided in subsection (c), if an instrument has been
paid or accepted by mistake and the case is not covered by subsection
(a), the person paying or accepting may, to the extent permitted by
the law governing mistake and restitution, (i) recover the payment
from the person to whom or for whose benefit payment was made or
(ii) in the case of acceptance, may revoke the acceptance.
Id.
105. See id. § 3-418(c) cmt. 1.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id. § 3-418 cmt. 1:
[I]n each case [(a) and (b)], by virtue of subsection (c), the drawee
loses the remedy if the person ... who took the check in good faith
and for value or who in good faith changed position in reliance on the
payment or acceptance .... The result in the two cases covered by
subsection (a) is that the drawee in most cases will not have a remedy
against the person paid because there is usually a person who took
the check in good faith and for value or who in good faith changed po-
sition in reliance on the payment or acceptance.
Id.
108. See id. § 3-417.
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senter presents an instrument to a payor bank for payment
who in turn pays it, the presenter warrants that at the time he
presented the instrument, he believes in "good faith" that (1)
the presenter received the instrument "from a person entitled
to enforce it;" (2) the instrument was not altered; (3) the pre-
senter "has no knowledge that the signature of the drawer of
the draft is unauthorized;" and (4) "with respect to any re-
motely-created consumer item[s], that the person on whose ac-
count the item is drawn authorized the issuance of the item in
the amount for which the item is drawn." 109 The first three pre-
sentment warranties do not alter the Price v. Neal doctrine,
however, because, by definition under the RUCC, the presenter
needs only believe in "good faith"110 that the instrument was
not doctored and was transferred by a person entitled to en-
force it. Such a clean heart is also a requirement under Price v.
Neal. In fact, the third warranty is, itself, a codification of the
Price v. Neal rule.1" However, the fourth presentment war-
ranty, added in 2002, provides a limited exception to the Price
v. Neal doctrine for specific instruments. 112 This amendment
possibly indicates a shift in the drafters' mentality towards ero-
sion of the Price v. Neal doctrine.
Negligence by the drawer has also been incorporated as a
ground for absolving the payor bank from liability under § 3-
406(a). 113 Under § 3-406, a drawer may be precluded from re-
covering from the payor bank "to the extent to which the fail-
ure... to exercise ordinary care [by the drawer] contributed to
the loss," a comparative allocation. 114 As provided by § 3-406(c),
109. Id. § 3-417(a)(1)-(4).
110. See id. § 3-417.
111. Id. § 3-417 cmt. 3, provides:
[S]ubsection (a)(3) retains the rule of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354
(1762), that the drawee takes the risk that the drawer's signature is
unauthorized unless the person presenting the draft has knowledge
that the drawer's signature is unauthorized. Under subsection (a)(3)
the warranty of no knowledge that the drawer's signature is unau-
thorized is also given by prior transferors of the draft.
Id.
112. See id. § 3-416 cmt. 8, app. XIX.
113. Id. § 3-406(a) reads:
A person whose failure to exercise ordinary care substantially
contributes to an alteration of an instrument or to the making of a
forged signature on an instrument is precluded from asserting the al-
teration or the forgery against a person who, in good faith, pays the
instrument or takes it for value or for collection.
Id.
114. Id. § 3-406(b) reads:
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"[u]nder subsection (a), the burden of proving failure to exercise
ordinary care is on the person asserting the preclusion."' 115
Lastly, § 3-406(c) provides "[u]nder subsection (b), the burden
of proving failure to exercise ordinary care is on the person pre-
cluded."1 16
4. Exceptions or Erosion?
Despite a "remarkable continuity"11 7 in the doctrine of
Price v. Neal throughout American commercial paper law, some
observers continue to question its usefulness. Some observers
would like to add exceptions to the rule of finality. For example,
by 2000, the California Bankers Clearing Association and Cali-
fornia Uniform Commercial Code had implemented non-
uniform exceptions."18 The effects of these provisions are "to
place the loss flowing from unauthorized demand drafts on the
depositary bank."119 Thus, their result is to "create[ ] a limited
exception to the venerable rule of Price v. Neal. . . by relieving
the drawee, in that context, of the ultimate economic responsi-
bility for the unauthorized signature of its customer."' 20
Whether such a movement will ultimately yield only narrowly
carved-out exceptions to the rule of finality, or will spell a
Under subsection (a), if the person asserting the preclusion fails
to exercise ordinary care in paying or taking the instrument and that
failure substantially contributes to loss, the loss is allocated between
the person precluded and the person asserting the preclusion accord-
ing to the extent to which the failure of each to exercise ordinary care
contributed to the loss.
Id.
115. Id. § 3-406(c) (emphasis added).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Dow, supra note 1, at 157.
118. Fred H. Miller, Modernizing the UCC for the New Millenium: Intro-
duction to a Collection on the New UCC, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 207-08
(2000).
119. Id. at 207. Importantly:
In recent years, the use of "demand drafts" as a payment mecha-
nism and, in some cases, a collection mechanism, has grown. Demand
drafts appear very much like traditional checks, except that they are
prepared by the payee and bear a legend such as "signature on file,"
"no signature required," or "authorized by customer." When actually
authorized by the named drawer, a demand draft can be an efficient
mechanism to process payments. The possibilities for fraud and mis-
use are obvious, though, especially in connection with telemarketing
activities, and have led to the federal Telemarketing and Consumer
Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act.
Id.
120. Id. at 208.
2004]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
wholesale erosion of it, remains to be seen. In either case, this
debate indicates that the rule of Price v. Neal is not entirely
without controversy.
5. Modern Justification
In contemporary banking, many payor banks do not actu-
ally take the time to compare the signature on an instrument to
a verifying signature card. 121 The typical exception is made for
unusually large checks. Still, three principal rationales are
made for maintaining the historical final payment rule.
First, the payor bank is presumed to have extensive infor-
mation concerning fraud rates, the types and amounts of
checks most typically used, and effective prevention measures.
Thus to the extent that these facts hold true, the payor banks
are in a good position to undertake prevention in many, if not
most, situations. 122 A payor bank will match the marginal cost
of acquiring or investing in technologies that deter or prevent
check fraud with the marginal loss that results from the possi-
bility that any particular check is a forgery.123
Second, adding the imposition of strict liability to the
bank's ostensible informational reservoir creates an even
stronger incentive for payor banks to acquire or invest in tech-
nologies that detect or deter check fraud.124 Third, the doctrine
continues to encourage finality in commercial paper transac-
tions. 125
Nonetheless, some commentators believe that "[t]he over-
whelming support for the basic doctrine in American law was
accompanied by a general failure to firmly settle on a satisfac-
tory justification for it."126 This position is maintained, despite
the fact that "this process was not as pronounced ... as in the
English courts."'127
121. See Am. Bankers Ass'n, Results of ABA DAFC Survey on Unauthor-
ized Unsigned Drafts, at http://www.aba.com/Compliance/DAFCsurveyjuly
2002.htm (July 2002) (last visited Sept. 1, 2004) [hereinafter ABA Survey].
122. See GILLETTE ET AL., supra note 66, at 344.
123. See id. at 345.
124. Cf. id. ("[U]nder each liability regime, negligence and strict liability,
banks will invest in precautions until the marginal cost of examination equals
the marginal gain in fraud detection.").
125. See generally PALMER, supra note 68 (discussing the doctrine of final-
ity).
126. Dow, supra note 1, at 138-39.
127. Id. at 139.
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C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: THE PATCHWORK FATE OF PRICE V.
NEAL IN ENGLISH LAW
Despite the English courts' acceptance of the doctrine of
Price v. Neal in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries, English judges began undermining the doctrine in 1841.128
During this period of time, English judges routinely selected a
"single factor from the Price v. Neal opinion as the justification
for that decision. .. "129 These judges would then hinge their
opinion on the stated justification while they rejected, explicitly
or implicitly, some of the other foundations of the doctrine. 130
Not surprisingly, such jurisprudence began to lead to inconsis-
tent results and the erosion of the prevalence of the Price v.
Neal rule in England.
Many English judges saw negligence as one of the basic
justifications for the Price v. Neal Doctrine. 131 However, the
1841 case of Kelly v. Solari'32 held that even when a party mak-
ing a mistaken payment is negligent, that fact would not pre-
clude recovery by that party. 133 The effect of this decision was
to undermine one of the key rationales supporting Price v.
Neal. 134
In the latter years of the nineteenth century, English
courts partially withdrew another of the proposed justifications
for Price v. Neal.135 A series of cases held that the defense of es-
toppel against the drawee would be limited to situations where
the negligent party owed a specific duty either to "the person
asserting the estoppel or to the general public."' 36 Later, Eng-
lish courts determined that a party that had mistakenly re-
ceived payment on a forged check had no special relationship
with the payor bank that gave rise to a duty on the part of the
128. Id. at 158-59.
129. Id. at 132 (citing Dow, supra note 25, at 33-34).
130. See Dow, supra note 1, at 132.
131. See id. at 158-59.
132. 152 Eng. Rep. 24 (Ex. 1841); Dow, supra note 1, at 159.
133. See 152 Eng. Rep. 24; Dow, supra note 1, at 159. Under Kelly, the sig-
nature cards that a payor bank maintains do not provide the payor bank with
actual knowledge; they simply provide a means to acquire knowledge of the
forgery. See Dow, supra note 1, at 159 n.234.
134. See Dow, supra note 1, at 159.
135. See id.
136. Id. (citing Lewes Sanitary Steam Laundry Co. v. Barclay & Co., 95
L.T.R. 444 (K.B. 1906); Patent Safety Gun Cotton Co. v. Wilson, 49 L.J.R. 713
(C.A. C.P.D. 1880); Arnold v. Cheque Bank, 1 C.P. 578 (1876)).
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bank to the mistaken payee. 137 As such, the bank was "not es-
topped from denying the validity of the signature." 138
Similarly, the potential use of the change-in-position justi-
fication was substantially limited in a number of Price v. Neal-
type cases. 139 One of the explanations for the Price v. Neal doc-
trine was that a presenter may have relied on the mistaken
payment or acceptance by the drawee and acted on the assump-
tion that the drawee had correctly paid on the draft. 140 The pre-
senter is said to have undergone a change in position to his det-
riment in reliance on the failure of the drawee to detect the
forgery and to have mistakenly paid or accepted the instru-
ment.1 4 1 As such, it would be unfair to punish the presenter for
the failure of the drawee to detect the forgery by requiring re-
payment of the draft.
In bill of exchange cases, some judges were unwilling to
presume a change in position. 142 However, in the latter half of
the nineteenth century, courts began to limit the applicability
of the change-in-position defense to instances where an agent
received payment and then paid funds over to another party,
relying on the validity of the initial payment. 143 Elsewhere, the
change-in-position defense was limited to situations where the
plaintiff breached a duty arising from a mutual relationship. 144
This approach eventually undermined Price v. Neal in the first
decades of the twentieth century. 14 5 In time, English courts
ceased to recognize a legal duty between the presenting party
137. See Dow, supra note 1, at 159.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 160-61.
140. See id. For example, in Cocks v. Masterman, 109 Eng. Rep. 335 (K.B.
1829), the King's Bench held that "the holder of a bill is entitled to know, on
the day when it becomes due, whether it is an honoured or dishonoured bill,
and that, if he receive[s] the money and is suffered to retain it during the
whole of that day, the parties who paid it cannot recover it back." Id. at 338.
Because the presenter had rights against "former parties on their signatures,"
the court assumed that the drawee had a duty to the presenter to identify
whether the instrument was to be paid or dishonored on the day when the in-
strument was presented. Id. The failure of the drawee to explain to the pre-
senter that the instrument was forged limited the power of the presenter to
pursue these former parties. See id. As such, the presenter had undergone a
change of position to his detriment because of the drawee's failure to detect a
forgery. Id.
141. See Dow, supra note 1, at 160-61.
142. See id. at 160.
143. See id. at 161.
144. See id. at 160.
145. See id.
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and the drawee. 146
The 1903 case of Imperial Bank v. Bank of Hamilton147
crippled the Price v. Neal doctrine even further. In this case,
the Privy Council held that a drawee making payment who had
the ability to discover a mistake but did not do so, could still re-
cover money paid under a mistake of fact.148 In addition, "the
'sham' doctrine, 149 which emerged in the [middle of the nine-
teenth] century, eventually narrowed the Price rule" by making
"a valid drawer's signature ... an essential requirement of a
valid bill of exchange."'150 Thus, the lack of a valid (i.e., not
forged) drawer signature prevented liability under both con-
tract, via the bills of exchange law, and criminal forgery law.151
Although the sham doctrine appeared to have little impact in
the nineteenth century, 152 it resurfaced in 1927 in the Supreme
Court of Ceylon. 153 Even then, the doctrine was largely ig-
nored 54 by English courts and commentators until it was
adopted in the 1974 case of National Westminster Bank Ltd. v.
Barclays Bank International Ltd.155 There, Justice Kerr held
that items with a forged drawer's signature were not negotiable
instruments and therefore, Price did not govern those types of
cases.
156
Thus, "in modern English law.., while the doctrine [of
Price v. Neal] has not been overturned, its justifications have
been largely undermined and its scope considerably limited so
that outside of a few specific situations there is very little left of
it in English law." 157 This patchwork erosion stands in stark
contrast to its essentially wholesale adoption in the American
146. Id.
147. 1 App. Cas. 49 (P.C. 1903); Dow, supra note 1, at 166.
148. See Imperial Bank, 1 App. Cas. 49; Dow, supra note 1, at 166.
149. The instrument is a "sham" because it was never a negotiable instru-
ment in the first place. See Dow, supra note 1, at 163 (citing 1 JOSEPH CHIrTY,
A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES, AND
BANKER'S CHECKS 9 (1834)).
150. Dow, supra note 1, at 163 (emphasis added) (citing Exparte Hayward,
6 L.R. ch. 546 (Ch. App. 1871); M'Call v. Taylor, 34 L.J.R.N.S. 365 (C.P. 1865);
Stoessiger v. S. E. Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 1248 (Q.B. 1854)).
151. See Dow, supra note 1, at 163.
152. See id. at 165-66.
153. See id. at 167-68 (citing Imperial Bank v. Abeyesinghe, 29 N.L.R. 257
(Ceylon 1927)).
154. See Dow, supra note 1, at 167 n.281.
155. 3 All E.R. 834 (Q.B. 1974); Dow, supra note 1, at 167 n.281.
156. See Dow, supra note 1, at 168.
157. Id. at 173.
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commercial paper system. 158 This differentiation is all the more
peculiar given the otherwise similar evolution of English and
American payments law. 159
III. FROM DICTATE TO DEFAULT
A. THE COST OF PRICE V. NEAL
As noted above, whatever the underlying rationale, the
principal effect of Price v. Neal is to prompt American payor
banks to compile extensive information concerning fraud rates,
types and amounts of checks used, and effective prevention
measures. 160 Assembling these mechanisms to collect informa-
tion and utilize it has a substantial price tag.161 To be effective,
banks must make tangible investments in data compilation and
information systems technology. 162 Payor banks likely will and
do inevitably burden customers with much or all of the cost of
matching the marginal cost of these investments to the mar-
ginal losses resulting from forgery. 163 This cost to consumers
can manifest itself in the form of higher fees, lower interest
payments to customers, or the curtailment of customer ser-
vices.
158. See supra Part II.B.
159. See Dow, supra note 1, at 173-74.
160. See supra Part II.B.5.
161. According to the American Bankers Association:
One in five money center banks spent more than $20 million each in
check fraud-related operating expense (not including actual losses).
The median expense per bank fell in the range of $5 million to $20
million for money center banks, between $250,000 and $1 million for
regional banks, from $10,000 to $50,000 for mid-size banks and less
than $5,000 for community banks.
Am. Bankers Ass'n, News Release 2002, Attempted Check Fraud Doubles to
$4.3 Billion According to ABA Survey (Nov. 13, 2002), at http://www.aba.coml
press+room/11l302checkfraud.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004) [hereinafter
ABA News Release 2002].
162. See id.; see also CORP. FOR AM. BANKING, FRAUD REDUCTION
SOFTWARE SOLUTION CARREKER, at http://www.aba.comlCAB/CABcarreker_
fraud.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004) (describing an ABA recommended bank-
ing software program available to banks that allow them to detect and prevent
check fraud); Am. Bankers Ass'n, News Release 2001, ABA Endorses Carreker
Products for Preventing Fraud and Improving Cash, Reserve Efficiency (Oct.
16 2001), at http://www.aba.com/CAB/CAB-carrekerpressrel.htm (last visited
Sept. 1, 2004).
163. See Bryan D. Hull, Common Law Negligence and Check Fraud Loss
Allocation: Has Common Law Supplemented or Supplanted the U.C.C.?, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 605, 613 (1990).
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B. WHAT Do PAYOR BANKS Do IN THE REAL WORLD?
Despite these substantial investments in fraud-detection
technology and the specter of strict liability, most payor banks
do not take the time to compare the signature on an instrument
to a verifying signature card except for unusually large
checks. 164 Although there is a dearth of empirical evidence on
this point, anecdote serves a useful purpose. "Time is money,"
as the saying goes. Despite the compilation of extensive data-
bases for verifying signature cards, the transaction costs for a
bank employee to actually utilize a database will likely out-
weigh the monetary benefits of fraud detection in many cir-
cumstances, especially during peak processing periods. The ap-
parent failure of banks in many instances to use all available
means of fraud detection is troublesome given the fact that at-
tempted and successful check fraud continues to rise. 165
The payor bank's theoretical incentive to detect fraud is
further complicated by the fact that even if a presenter or ac-
count holder is well educated on his legal rights under commer-
cial paper law, and points to RUCC § 3-418(c) in a Price v. Neal
situation, a payor bank can simply refuse to credit the pre-
senter's account or decline to restore the account holder's bal-
ance. Moreover, a payor bank may simply misrepresent to an
uninformed account holder or presenter that he bears the bur-
den of loss.
In either case, the cost of litigation effectively precludes the
proper crediting of a presenter's account or restoring the ac-
count holder's balance in the instance of a small check. 166 It is
164. See ABA Survey, supra note 121 (indicating that banks do not physi-
cally inspect all of the nearly fifty billion checks processed each year). See also
John M. Norwood, Bank Negligence and the Forgery Doctrine, 115 BANKING
L.J. 254, 256-61 (1998) and cases discussed therein.
165. See ABA News Release 2002, supra note 161. According to the 1999
ABA Deposit Account Fraud Survey Report, $2.2 billion in fraudulent checks
were presented to U.S. banks that year, resulting in actual bank losses of $679
million. Id. That amounts to a success rate of almost thirty-one percent.
A recent survey indicates that banks have become far more proficient at
detecting fraudulent checks. Id. Of the $4.3 billion attempted to be obtained by
fraudulent checks in 2001, only $698 million was actually obtained. Id. While
this is almost $20 million more in actual losses than in 1999, it is only about
half of the loss as a matter of percentage of actual loss to attempted fraud.
Just over sixteen percent of the attempted fraud resulted in actual loss to the
banks in 2001. See also AM. BANKERS ASS'N, DEPOSIT ACcOUNT FRAUD, at
http://aba.com/Compliance/DAFCoverview.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
166. See Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Ar-
ticles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 569-70 (1991).
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only in the case of a relatively large check that the marginal
benefit of recovery would equal or be greater than the marginal
cost of litigation. 16 7
Of course, a payor bank would still have "the burden of
proving failure to exercise ordinary care"168 as "the person as-
serting the preclusion"1 69 in the course of bona fide litigation.
Nonetheless, the payor bank could, with no immediate cost to
itself, perfunctorily claim its belief that the presenter or ac-
count holder must have been negligent. By taking such a
stance, the payor bank can force the adverse party to make a
difficult decision.170 The presenter or account holder at this
point has to weigh the costs of a lawsuit against the payor bank
and the likelihood of success against the value of payment on
the instrument. 171
The resulting, strong-form conclusion is that, "consumers
can virtually never enforce their rights against a bank because
it will simply be too expensive to do so."172 Thus, despite the
substantially strong de jure adherence to the rule of Price v.
Neal, the American litigation system's high transaction costs
almost certainly cause a substantial de facto misallocation of
forgery costs to be imposed on legally innocent presenters or
account holders.
C. A COASEIAN CONFLUENCE AND THE HAYEKIAN
DECENTRALIZED NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE
The nature of payor bank firms' usual information-
processing competence does not, by itself, supply an adequate
rationale for uniformly imposing strict liability on them in all
instances. It is economically efficient for a payor bank to pursue
fraud detection only to the extent that its internal cost is less
167. See id.
168. U.C.C. § 3-406(c) (2003).
169. Id. § 3-406(b).
170. See Rubin, supra note 166, at 569.
171. See id. at 569-70.
172. Id. at 569. Rubin points out that such a system is highly inefficient.
Id. With the RUCC applying a comparative negligence rule, the parties are
prone to squabble over each and every aspect of a case, thus driving up the
cost of any potential litigation. Id. Because the precise allocation of negligence
is vital, every fact has particular significance. Id. This causes increased costs
of discovery and can cause trials to be dragged out. Id. As the cost of the litiga-
tion increases, the actual benefit of any outcome decreases. Id. It is only in the
very large cases that the amount at issue will be greater than the amount
spent determining the fault of the parties. See id. at 569-70.
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than the corresponding external cost. Allowing parties to real-
locate fraud risk more efficiently based on their particularized
knowledge would reduce social costs, including consumer costs.
1. The Nature of the Firm and the Commercial Paper System
a. The Nature of the Firm
To understand what a "firm" is, one must first understand
the fundamental reason a firm exists, which is to reduce trans-
action costs among human beings engaged in economic ex-
change intended to create mutual value. 173 Transaction cost
economics finds its beginnings with Nobel Economics Laureate
Ronald Coase's famous 1937 article The Nature of the Firm.174
A firm mitigates or avoids many transaction costs by producing
some production inputs for itself internally (in-house).17 5 As a
result, a firm expands its operations until the marginal cost of
producing an input internally equals the external (market)
price of that input. 76 When the internal cost becomes greater
than the market price, a firm will no longer engage in that ac-
tivity, leaving it for external parties to perform more
cheaply. 177 When external transaction costs are high, internal
firm organization is efficient (if only by comparison). 178 In con-
trast, when external transaction costs are low, autonomous,
arm's-length market relations will proliferate. 179 A firm also ex-
ists in legal terms as a nexus of contracts that helps to reduce
agency costs by preventing employees from enriching them-
173. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386,
393 (1937) (providing a working definition of the term "firm" to be used in eco-
nomic theory).
174. Id.
175. See id. at 394-96. The entrepreneurial model as described by Coase
states that obtaining goods in the market is not costless in that there is a cost
to the operation of the market itself. See id. The entrepreneur therefore must
direct a firm and the available resources at a cost that is less to the firm than
the market can provide, essentially suppressing the price mechanism as it re-
lates to the firm. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Trans-
action Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 558-59 (1981).
179. See id. This is simply the converse of the previous sentence in that it
is another way of saying that firms will look to the market to provide them
with the materials they need if the costs of doing so are lower than creating
the material internally.
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selves at the expense of owners.180 This nexus, in turn, reduces
internal transaction costs. 18 '
A firm evolves these transaction-cost boundaries out to the
edge of its core competencies and capabilities. 8 2 Essentially,
this boundary marks what the firm is good at in terms of its
specific information capital or know-how for solving economic
problems. 8 3 A firm may have more than one core competence,
but attempts to fuse disparate competencies together rarely
yield benefits, as firms will tend to spend more time on what
they are "less good" at than on their strengths, reducing their
competitiveness, efficiency, and-ultimately-the value they
create for their stakeholders. 8 4
Together, then, a firm can be defined as a group of hetero-
geneous resources organized into one or more core compe-
tence(s) and capabilities to reduce the transaction costs of hu-
man exchange by creating production inputs internally to the
extent that the marginal cost of doing so is less than or equal to
an input's external market price.'8 5
b. The Firm and the Commercial Paper System
All financial institutions function as an information matrix
180. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 310 (1976). Jensen & Meckling define agency costs as follows:
(1) the costs of creating and structuring contracts between the princi-
ple and the agent (both explicit and implicit contracts)
(2) the monitoring expenditures by the principle (measuring or ob-
serving the behavior of the agent as well as efforts to control the be-
havior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation poli-
cies, operating rules and the like)
(3) the bonding expenditures of the agent, and
(4) the residual loss.
Id. at 308 nn.9-10, 309.
181. See id. at 310.
182. See C.K. Prahalad & Gary Hamel, The Core Competence of the Corpo-
ration, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 79, 81; see also George Stalk et
al., Competing on Capabilities: The New Rules of Corporate Strategy, HARV.
Bus REV., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 57, 66 (describing the similarities and differ-
ences between core competencies and core capabilities and likening their com-
bination to the "grand unifying theory" in the field of physics).
183. See Prahalad & Hamel, supra note 182, at 81-83.
184. See Coase, supra note 173, at 394-95 (stating that through excessive
expansion, a firm will at some point fail "to make the best use of the factors of
production").
185. Id. at 393 (stating that a firm "consists of the system of relationships
which come into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an
entrepreneur").
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that is designed to align a kaleidoscope of consumer financial
wants with a variegated array of available financial prod-
ucts.1 8 6 Thus, every financial institution possesses some type of
financial information processing core competence.18 7 Similarly,
to obtain in the first instance and thereafter retain customers,
all financial institutions have a capability in "customer-
centricity" that aids the targeting of particular products to par-
ticular consumers. 188
On some level, payor banks also possess core information-
processing competence and capability. 8 9 Thus, the nature of a
payor bank as a firm provides support for the thesis that a
payor bank can accumulate information on fraud and the abil-
ity to prevent it.190 Although a payor bank may often be in the
best position to compile a financial fraud matrix, it does not
necessarily follow from this fact alone that a payor bank is, per
se, in the best position in all circumstances to vigorously act on
that information to prevent fraud.191 It is economically efficient
186. See Stalk et al., supra note 182, at 68-69. Stalk and company examine
and compare the core capabilities of two fast growing regional banks: Wacho-
via and Banc One. The authors' basic premise is that each bank has developed
a set of core capabilities that enables each to deliver flexible customer service
from two very different perspectives. See id. Wachovia focuses on providing
customers throughout the regions with a superior level of individualized cus-
tomer service much like a corporate client would receive. See id. at 68. Banc
One on the other hand, focuses on serving the particular needs of specific
communities by giving its local branches a high level of autonomy so that they
may adapt to the specific needs of the community. See id. at 68-69.
187. See, e.g., id. As Stalk points out, the core competence of Wachovia is
its ability to treat the individual customer with a great deal of personal ser-
vice. See id. at 68. This personal attention to the individual customer results
in Wachovia's having "the highest 'cross-sell ratio'-the average number of
products per customer-of any bank in the country." Id. at 68. To perform
these services, Wachovia has developed a specialized support system that in-
tegrates customer information and allows the personalized bankers to respond
to customer requests by the end of the day in many cases. See id. Banc One, by
focusing on local needs, has allowed its branches to develop community roots.
See id. However, unlike most local banks, Banc One has a highly centralized
informational system that allows each branch manager to learn from the prac-
tice of other Banc One branches. See id. at 68-69.
188. See, e.g., id.
189. See, e.g., id.
190. See supra Part III.B; see also CORP. FOR AM. BANKING, supra note 162
(discussing a system that can be used by banks to detect counterfeit and
forged checks and evaluate deposit fraud); ABA News Release 2002, supra
note 161 (crediting banks' check fraud prevention systems with keeping actual
fraud losses significantly lower than the number of fraud attempts in 2001).
191. Cf. supra Part II.B.5 (discussing the modern justification for the final-
ity rule imposing liability on the payor bank).
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for a payor bank to attempt to detect fraud only to the extent
that the internal transaction cost of doing so is less than the
corresponding external cost.192
2. Hayek's Decentralized Nature of Knowledge and the
Efficient Management of Fraud
Price v. Neal is essentially a case about allocating the bur-
den of fraud to the "innocent" party that had the most knowl-
edge to stop the fraud prior to payment. 9 3 Thus, the party that
could have verified the signature against a signature card is
the party that bears the burden of the risk of loss. Although the
modern rationale for the rule of finality in Price v. Neal dove-
tails with the realities of knowledge acquisition in some in-
stances, it is not necessarily true that it does so in all instances.
As Nobel Economics Laureate F. A. Hayek observed in his
seminal 1945 article The Use of Knowledge in Society, knowl-
edge is typically decentralized and diffuse, and is often only
tacitly held. 194 Although knowledge can be gathered and as-
sembled into various forms for human manipulation, the more
decentralized, diffuse, and tacit knowledge is, the higher the
cost of its assembly and manipulation. When legal rules further
limit the ability to use knowledge, the impediments to efficient
192. See Coase, supra note 173, at 394-96. See generally ABA News Re-
lease 2002, supra note 161 (noting that in 2001 the external cost, in the form
of actual losses, to banks from check fraud was $698 million).
193. See supra Part II.
194. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, AM. ECON. REV.,
XXXV, No. 4 (Sept. 1945), 519-30, reprinted in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC
ORDER 77 (The Univ. of Chi. Press 1957) (1948). Hayek states:
[T]he "data" from which the economic calculus starts are never for the
whole society "given" to a single mind which could work out the impli-
cations and can never be so given.
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order
is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circum-
stances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or
integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and fre-
quently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals
possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem
of how to allocate "given" resources-if "given" is taken to mean given
to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these
"data." It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of re-
sources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose rela-
tive importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is
a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone
in its totality.
Id. at 77-78; see also THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 3-20 (Ba-
sic Books 1980).
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use of this knowledge are further increased. This is especially
true when the cost of gathering a particular type of knowledge
is high.
The efficiency of the commercial paper system depends
critically on how freely transaction costs are allowed to con-
verge at their lowest levels, and thus transmit knowledge per-
taining to fraud at the lowest cost to human beings. To the ex-
tent that the external transaction cost of assembling
information on commercial paper fraud and managing the po-
tential loss therefrom is less than the corresponding internal
cost for a payor bank, it is more economically efficient to allow
an external party195 to bear that cost. This result, of course, is
presently disallowed in the American system.
Thus, in the name of preserving finality 196 and laboring
under the mistaken assumption that a payor bank is always
best positioned to detect fraud, 197 Price v. Neal presses the
commercial paper system into a scheme where transaction
costs are not necessarily allowed to converge at their lowest
levels. Instead, payor banks must spend significant amounts of
time at suboptimum efficiency levels performing fraud-
management tasks for which they are often unsuited. The re-
sult is an inefficient, and therefore more costly, allocation of the
burden of fraud.
This inefficient result is especially strange considering the
obvious fact that a payor bank typically has no direct involve-
ment in the highly decentralized acts of issuing and negotiating
a draft. Therefore, the cost of compiling fraud management to a
payor bank is high. By contrast, for persons directly involved
with the issuance and negotiation of a draft, knowledge is more
readily available. Therefore, the cost associated with manage-
195. An external party is any party that is not the payor bank.
196. Subcomm. on Payments, Unif. Commercial Code Comm. Of the Am.
Bar Ass'n's Section of Bus. Law, Deterring Check Fraud: The Model Positive
Pay Services Agreement and Commentary, 54 BUS. LAW. 637, 642 n.29 (1999)
[hereinafter Subcomm. on Payments].
197. See Alvin C. Harrell, Impact of Revised UCC Articles 3 and 4 on For-
gery and Alteration Scenarios, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 232, 235 (1997)
(arguing that Price v. Neal is based on the theory that the bank is in the best
position to determine if fraud exists and thus should be the one to bear the
burden). The assertion that a bank is in a position to determine one aspect of
fraud ignores the fact that the cost to determine such fraud may be unbeara-
bly high (considering banks generally do not actually check signature cards).
Also, Harrell's assertion ignores the possibility of others being in a better posi-
tion to prevent the fraud from occurring in the first place, determine that
fraud has occurred, or bear the burden of the fraud.
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ment of fraud to such persons should typically be significantly
lower.
3. The Problem of Social Cost and Transforming Dictate to
Default
a. The Coase Theorem
In another famous article, The Problem of Social Cost,1 98
Ronald Coase pointed out that as long as parties can make and
enforce contracts in their mutual interest, direct regulation be-
yond an initial assignment of property rights is unnecessary
where there are no transaction costs.199 That is, when transac-
tion costs are zero, if an agreement is made that mutually
benefits both concerned parties, then any individual definition
of property rights leads to an efficient outcome. 200 This postu-
late is generally referred to as the Coase Theorem.
b. The Social Cost of Fraud
As noted above, the costs from fraud in the commercial pa-
per system are enormous and are ultimately borne by consum-
ers, despite the widespread adoption of Price v. Neal. Ironically,
despite being an ostensibly pro-presenter/pro-account holder
rubric, 201 it is precisely the rigidity of the application of Price v.
198. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1-44
(1960).
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER, WHAT ECONOMICS
HAS To Do WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 41-42 (2000). Some economists
have dismissed the Coase Theorem as a mere intellectual curiosity, because
transaction costs are often greater than zero in the real world. Id. The theo-
rem, however, does have some very important real world applications that
have been verified. Id.
For example, bees graze on the flowers of various, but particular, crops.
Id. But bees do not respect property rights. Id. Without property rights or the
ability to make contracts, a farmer who grows such crops can receive none of
the benefits himself if the bees are owned by another person. Id. Thus, the
farmer would have a low incentive to grow nectar-rich crops. Id. In a real
world with property rights and contracts, however, the following occurs:
[C]ontracts between beekeepers and farmers have been common prac-
tice in the industry at least since early in this century. When the
crops were producing nectar and did not need pollination, beekeepers
paid farmers for permission to put their hives in the farmers' fields.
When the crops were producing little nectar but needed pollination
(which increases yields), farmers paid beekeepers.
Id.
201. See Brian Patrick Perrvman. Checking Checks: American Airlines
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Neal that prevents the reduction of costs or the offering of in-
centives to bank customers, including presenters.
Take, for example, the common situation where a pre-
senter knows firsthand the identity of a maker 20 2 of a draft in-
dorsed over to him and can, therefore, directly verify the draft's
authenticity. The presenter (and others similarly situated) will
still unnecessarily bear a portion of the cost of fraud preven-
tion, as incurred initially by a payor bank and then passed to
the presenter himself. Notably, this situation results even
though the presenter does not bear any direct liability on the
instrument, as the bank has no right to charge him for an un-
authorized check. 20 3 The same is true for other presenters simi-
larly situated. The knowledgeable presenter ultimately bears
the cost of the indiscriminate presenter. Moreover, an account
holder who diligently protects access to his checks or other in-
struments nonetheless still currently bears a proportion of the
costs of more careless account holders.
This malevolent result is the direct outcome of the inability
to opt out of the Price v. Neal rule. As indicated by the Coase
Theorem, the ability to reassign property rights in a zero-
transaction-cost world would yield a more efficient outcome in
the American commercial paper system. Such efficiency, how-
ever, requires two things: (1) the ability to assign such rights
and (2) zero, or at least low, transaction costs. Removing the
handcuffs of the Price v. Neal rule will allow the transaction
costs to settle to their most efficient level and will also allow
the parties to freely assign their rights as they choose.
c. Moving From a Dictate to a Default Rule
First, to encourage the parties to take actions to best allo-
cate the burdens associated with draft forgery, an initial as-
signment of that burden must be determined. Given the al-
ready strong position of a payor bank vis A vis an innocent
presenter or account holder due to de facto litigation costs, it
makes little sense from an efficiency standpoint to further
strengthen that position by reassigning the initial burden of
Employees Federal Credit Union v. Martin and the Amenability of Common
Law Waiver to Deposit Agreement Cutdown Provisions, 10 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 551, 552 n.7 (2002).
202. See U.C.C. § 3-103(7) (2003) ("'Maker' means a person who signs or is
identified in a note as a person undertaking to pay.").
203. See Maurice Portley, Forged Checks: An Analysis of Civil Liability
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 927, 931 (1996).
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forgery detection to the presenter or account holder. Instead, to
achieve an efficient outcome by encouraging parties to come to
agreements to allocate risk, the initial assignment should be
that a payor bank continues to bear the loss of forgery. Thus,
the dictate of Price v. Neal is correct insofar as it initially as-
signs the risk of loss from a forged draft to the payor bank.
From that point onward, however, parties should be al-
lowed to allocate the burden of draft forgery detection as they
see fit. Therefore, the rule assigning the risk of loss should be
transformed from a per se dictate to a default provision, subject
to the commercial reasonableness requirement of RUCC § 4-
103(a).204 If another party agrees to assume the risk of loss
from forgery, a payor bank should be allowed to opt out of the
Price v. Neal strict liability regime and assign that burden to a
presenter, depositary bank, or account holder.
With much foresight, the "UCC was designed with 'expan-
sion joints' so that amendment would be necessary only at in-
frequent intervals." 20 5 As noted in § 1-103 of the RUCC, "[This
act] must be liberally construed and applied to promote its un-
derlying purposes and policies." 206 These "underlying purposes
and polices," 20 7 in turn, are "to permit the continued expansion
of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement
of the parties." 20 8 Therefore, "[tihe effect of the provisions...
may be varied by agreement... ."209 The flexibility of the UCC,
however, does have limits. Amendment, therefore, will some-
times be necessary to cover substantially new forms of transac-
tions or place new boundaries on commercial activities. 210
This burden falls on legislatures of the individual states to
implement such changes. These legislatures have the power to
change the present rules to the more efficient rules suggested
204. U.C.C. § 4-103(a) reads:
The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agree-
ment, but the parties to the agreement cannot disclaim a bank's re-
sponsibility for its lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary
care or limit the measure of damages for the lack or failure. However,
the parties may determine by agreement the standards by which the
bank's responsibility is to be measured if those standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
Id.
205. Miller, supra note 118, at 192.
206. U.C.C. § 1-103(a).
207. Id.
208. Id. § 1-103(a)(2).
209. Id. § 4-103(a).
210. See Miller, sunra note 118, at 203.
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here, and some are already moving in that direction.211 In this
instance, allowing a payor bank to contract out of RUCC § 3-
418 requires such an amendment.
Second, although perfectly frictionless transaction costs do
not exist in the real world, they are often close enough to zero
to substantially satisfy the Coase Theorem. The power of the
Coase Theorem is, of course, the insight it provides into real
world transactions. When spread over numerous transactions,
a payor bank could, for a sufficiently low cost, hire attorneys to
draft standardized agreements that would allow a party, if the
party so chooses, to assume the risk of loss from a forged
drawer's signature or to compensate parties for their decision
to accept the risks of loss.
A payor bank will have many ways to contractually induce
another party into accepting this burden. Principally, such in-
ducements may include payment of a percentage based on the
value of the draft presented, or a flat fee payment. Drawees
may also provide premium services, better interest rates, or
other superior treatment to a party who shifts a significant risk
of fraud detection to itself, especially when the party does so on
a repeated basis or on large sum drafts.
Some might question the reality of such inducements based
on a lack of bargaining power on the part of noninstitutional,
individual parties to draft payments. 212 However, there is no
inherent reason to expect that such a noninstitutional individ-
ual would shift the risk of loss to himself without appropriate
compensation. Instead, payor banks would have significant fi-
nancial incentives to offer reasonable contractual terms and the
best possible array of compensatory options to persons who
could aid them in reducing their fraud detection costs.
Moreover, when considered in the aggregate, the bargain-
ing power of such individuals is, in fact, great. Thus, for in-
stance, vigorous competition for the business of individual ac-
count holders would guard against the possibility that payor
banks might attempt to establish uniform customer contracts
211. Id. at 208.
212. See, e.g., Kerry Lynn Macintosh, Liberty, Trade, and the Uniform
Commercial Code: When Should Default Rules Be Based on Business Prac-
tices?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1465, 1470 (1997). Macintosh argues,
"[c]onsumers lack the knowledge and power to bargain effectively with banks,
and have few alternative payment mechanisms available to them. Unfortu-
nately, this lack of meaningful choice within a significant segment of the mar-
ket makes it hard to justify the codification of checking account practices on
liberty grounds." Id.
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that attempted to automatically shift the burden to an individ-
ual account holder. Any such attempt to manipulate a de jure
default rule into a de facto dictate where the account holder
automatically bears the loss would inevitably result in mass de-
fections to more consumer-friendly banks or customer-owned
credit unions that would be eager to differentiate themselves to
gain business. 213
4. Contracting for the Most Efficient Allocation of Draft
Forgery Detection
Given the choice to opt out of the Price v. Neal structure, a
payor bank could negotiate with any of the three other parties
to a draft or check payment to shift the burden of loss. Each of
these results is consistent with the fundamental tenant of
commercial paper law that the burden of loss from an instru-
ment should be placed on the person who dealt with the wrong-
doer.214
a. Contracting to Allow the Presenter to Assume the Risk of
Draft Forgery Detection
If a presenter agrees to assume the burden of draft forgery
detection, a payor bank should be allowed to opt out of Price v.
Neal by contract. Such a contract could take one of two forms.
One form of contract would be an agreement on the pre-
sentment of an individual draft, using a standardized contract.
Such a standardized contract could be made available to a pre-
senter in the same way that bank deposit slips, travelers
checks, or other services are commonly made available to pre-
senters in a bank lobby. By signing such a standardized con-
tract, the presenter would warranty to the payor bank that the
specified drafts do not bear a forged drawer signature.
A second form of contract would be a continuous blanket
contract. Such a contract could be signed when the soon-to-be
presenter initially opens an account with the depositary bank,
or at some point thereafter when the account holder begins
213. Free checking is a good example of banks becoming more consumer-
friendly to win business, despite the relatively weak bargaining power of an
individual account holder as compared to the bank.
214. See Harrell, supra note 197, at 233-37. The common element in much
of the commercial paper system is to look up the chain of title placing the bur-
den on the person closest to the forger, by a series of warranties granted with
the passage of title. Id. The passage of title to the payor bank does not include
such warranties. Id.
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presenting drafts. By signing such a blanket contract with the
depositary bank, the presenter would warrant to all potential
payor banks that all such presented drafts will not bear any
forged drawer or indorser's signatures, and that they accept the
risk of fraud therefrom.
With either type of contract, a presenter who chooses to as-
sume the risk of draft forgery detection in exchange for com-
pensation from the payor bank thus has an incentive to monitor
the identity and trustworthiness of the persons it deals with in
draft transactions. This is particularly realistic in the common
situation where a presenter knows firsthand the identity of a
maker of a draft indorsed to him and can, therefore, directly
verify the draft's authenticity.
Importantly, in either case, a presenter would retain com-
plete control over the shifting of such a burden, alleviating any
fear of lack of bargaining power or legal unconscionability. 2 15
Furthermore, if the presented draft bears a forged drawer sig-
nature and the presenter, therefore, is called on to assume the
burden of that fraud, the presenter is not without recourse. The
presenter may still proceed against the draft's former indorsers
and transferees by enforcing the presentment 216 and transfer
warranties 217 made by those persons.
b. Contracting to Allow the Depositary Bank to Assume the
Risk of Draft Forgery Detection
A payor bank may seek to escape its liability on forged
drafts imposed by the Price v. Neal doctrine by attempting to
contract that liability to the depositary bank. The payor bank
would need to provide some incentive for the depositary bank to
agree to assume liability for forged drafts. The depository bank
without any incentive, like an account holder similarly situ-
ated, would not agree to assume liability for forgeries that
would otherwise automatically fall on the payor bank.
By shifting the burden of draft forgery detection to the de-
positary bank in some cases, overall efficiency in the check col-
lection system would be increased. In cases where the deposi-
tary bank has some type of special relationship with the
presenter, it is in a better position than the payor bank to de-
tect forged drafts.
215. See, e.g., Macintosh, supra note 212.
216. See U.C.C. § 3-417 (2003).
217. See id. § 3-416.
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A recent amendment to RUCC § 3-417(a) added a fourth
presentment warranty. 218 This addition demonstrates the Code
drafter's willingness to create exceptions to the Price v. Neal
doctrine in cases where the payor bank is not in the best posi-
tion to detect forged drafts. As a result of the new amendment,
the payor bank is automatically relieved of liability on forged
drafts in certain cases.219
Allowing a depositary bank to assume the burden of forged
draft detection and placing that burden farther up the chain of
transactions, closer to where such forgery might occur, is par-
ticularly appealing. It reinforces an underlying tenant of the
American commercial paper system, by holding liable the party
who deals with the wrongdoer. The depositary bank may have
actually dealt with the forger and thus should be held liable.
The depositary bank could then try to shift its potential li-
ability to the person presenting the draft. As described earlier,
the depositary bank would have to provide an incentive to the
presenter to entice them to accept liability for potentially
forged drafts. This type of arrangement with the presenter to
further allocate the risk of loss would place the burden even
closer to the person who dealt with the wrongdoer.
Notwithstanding, in the case of a presenter who agrees to
assume the burden of draft fraud protection, if a depositary
bank pays on a forged draft it would retain its rights to enforce
presentment, 220 if they are also the payor bank, and transfer
warranties. 221
c. Contracting to Allow the Account Holder to Assume the Risk
of Draft Forgery Detection
Another party to whom the payor bank may attempt to
contract away its liability imposed under the Price v. Neal doc-
trine is the account holder. Once again the payor bank would
need to offer an incentive to the account holder in exchange for
their agreement to accept liability on forged drafts.
Likewise, if an account holder agrees to assume the burden
of draft forgery prevention for drafts which are (1) approved for
use by the payor bank, and (2) are within the account holder's
218. See id. § 3-417(a).
219. See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Weisman, 223 F.3d 229 (3d Cir.
2000).
220. See U.C.C. § 3-417.
221. See id. § 3-416.
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control, a payor bank should once more be allowed to opt out of
Price v. Neal by contract. In many, if not most, instances, payor
banks are in the best position to detect forgery, but they are
certainly not in the best position to prevent it from occurring in
the first place. 222
The King's Bench in Price v. Neal was concerned with plac-
ing the burden of fraud detection on an otherwise innocent
party.223 However, since the account holder has significant
power to forestall forgery on the payor bank-approved drafts
within its control, the account holder is not necessarily-as the
presenter Neale likely was-any more innocent than a payor
bank. 224
Under RUCC § 4-401, an account holder is presently only
liable on a check that he signs. 225 However, allowing an account
holder to contract to accept the burden of draft fraud detection
would thus align that burden with a party who has a signifi-
cant amount of power to prevent draft forgery in the first place.
Ultimately, the account holder has as much, if not more, poten-
tial to prevent draft forgery than any other party because the
account holder controls unwritten checks, as well as access to
them by others.
By accepting this burden the account holder would then
have a significant incentive to take greater care of drafts within
his control. Individuals would have greater motivation to keep
their checkbook in a safe place, rather than in their glove com-
partment. Businesses would have greater incentives to restrict
employee access to checks and more closely monitor the actions
of employees with access to them.
Modern mass retailers and credit card companies rarely
hesitate to sell their customers insurance for their financial
products. 226 Payor banks could do the same for their account
holders. While contracting away his RUCC § 3-418(c) right to
recover on a forged draft, an account holder could simultane-
222. See supra Part III.C.l.b (discussing payor banks' ability to detect for-
gery but not prevent it).
223. See Price v. Neal, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
224. See Alvin C. Harrell, NCCUSL Articles 3, 4, and 4A Drafting Commit-
tee Highlights Current Payment System and Negotiable Instrument Issues, 54
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 351, 363 (2000).
225. See U.C.C. § 4-401. Thus, an "item containing a forged drawer's signa-
ture or forged indorsement is not properly payable" from the account holder to
the drawee. Id. § 4-401 cmt. 1.
226. See, e.g., A.J. Mistretta, Credit Insurance Criticized as Unnecessary
Expense, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, July 15, 2002, at 30.
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ously contract back with his payor bank to purchase various
levels of forgery protection at various prices. This could also be
done at some later date if the account holder so chooses. Allow-
ing an account holder to assume the burden of draft forgery de-
tection for drafts within his control would also permit the ac-
count holder to self-determine and more precisely calibrate his
own desired level of exposure to the risk of draft forgery.
An account holder could require the payor bank to verify
all of his checks, or none of them. The payor bank, in turn,
could calculate a blanket or per-check charge for such verifica-
tion, instead of passing the cost on to all customers. Or, to
achieve a more precise allocation of the burden of draft forgery
detection, a payor bank and its account holder could contract to
require the payor bank to verify some signatures deemed suffi-
ciently risky by the account holder. In such a contract, the
payor bank could be required to verify the signatures and con-
tinue to assume the typical Price v. Neal-type risk of drawer
forgery on drafts above a certain agreed upon dollar amount. At
the same time, the burden of forgery detection for drafts below
the agreed upon dollar amount would remain with the account
holder, having contracted away his RUCC § 3-418 right to re-
cover payment on a forged draft.
Additionally, the payor bank and account holder could con-
tract to allow the account holder to designate certain present-
ers from which the customer will accept the burden of draft for-
gery detection. Account holders who frequently send a limited
number of checks to certain trustworthy persons, or who send
checks to the very same persons frequently, would find this ar-
rangement attractive. The account holder could create a list of
presenters for which the burden automatically shifts to him,
while the bank would continue to bear the burden of loss for
any presenter not specified on the list.
Importantly, though, in order to be rational and effi-
cient,227 any rule allowing an account holder to contractually
assume the burden of draft forgery detection must limit that
assumption to those drafts (1) approved for use by the payor
bank and (2) actually placed into the account holder's control by
the payor bank. Otherwise, an account holder would be at the
mercy of both ingenious draft forgers228 and ultimately its own
227. See supra Part III.C.3 (addressing more efficient rules based on the
Coase Theorem).
228. E.g., ABAGNALE, supra note 8.
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payor bank. Without this limitation, a forger would have every
incentive to devise ever-more convincing forgeries.
In contrast, a payor bank would have no incentive to do
anything other than indiscriminately pay out on any passable
draft bearing the account holder's name, which it could do with
total impunity. Thus, the payor bank would still have a de
minimus fraud monitoring function in that it would be obliged
to examine a draft to verify that the underlying physical draft
was created or approved for use by the payor bank itself and
first given into the account holder's control. Thus, a payor bank
can only shift liability to its account holder for approved drafts
on which they are identified as the drawee.
The payor bank has a recurring relationship with only one
of the other three parties to payment on a draft: the account
holder. Given this relationship, it is probable that the payor
bank will likely contract with this party to allocate the risk.
Shifting the burden to the account holder is potentially the
most promising way to reduce both forgery and transaction
costs.
5. Benefits
The result of transforming Price v. Neal from dictate to de-
fault is that the cost of detecting draft forgery to a payor bank,
its account holders, and other bank customers would be more
efficiently allocated to the parties best able to bear that bur-
den.229
In may instances, payor banks would not have to take the
time or other associated expense to verify a signature card or
conduct a further investigation. Payor banks would need to
spend less on overhead costs associated with gathering infor-
mation to prevent forgery. These costs would not be passed on
to other bank customers, as they are presently. Such saved
costs could then be returned to bank customers and/or split
with the party who accepts the burden of draft forgery detec-
tion.
Presenters, of course, would receive a monetary premium
for actively monitoring draft forgery. While likely insubstantial
in the individual instance of a small value draft, aggregate
premiums would be tangible in instances of repeated present-
229. An ounce of prevention is, of course, worth a pound of cure. This is the
main theme of allowing burden shifting to someone who can prevent the for-
gery from occurring in the first place.
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ment or presentment of large-value drafts. Similarly, deposi-
tary banks and account holders would receive compensation for
actively monitoring draft forgery.
Thus, allowing the costs of draft forgery detection to settle
on the party most willing to bear them and best able to prevent
the forgery would reduce the overall costs of banking. Although
the precise effect is difficult to estimate, together, the economic
benefits from such a transformation could easily amount to
many millions of dollars annually.
Finally, the argument for the perpetuation of Price v. Neal
that has prevailed over time is that it creates finality because
the drawee is not able to reverse a series of transactions after
discovery of the forgery. 230 Importantly, allowing payor banks
to bargain with the other parties to payment on a draft will not
lead to an unraveling of the transaction. As in the case where
the burden is shifted to an account holder, the funds will be
withdrawn from the account holder's account and paid to the
presenter as if the check were genuine. The bank would not
pursue the presenter 231 for the funds and the certainty and fi-
nality remain.
CONCLUSION
To combat the problem of draft forgery, this Article argues
that the doctrine of finality, as embodied in the case of Price v.
Neal and § 3-418(c) of the RUCC should be transformed from a
rigid, per se dictate into a default rule. Importantly, the ele-
gance of this solution both relieves the doctrinal pressures of
the strict form of Price v. Neal and avoids the sort of undesir-
able patchwork erosion of the rule of finality that has taken
place in English courts. This transformation should allow par-
ties to payment on a draft to better allocate the burden of draft
forgery detection to the party who is best able to bear the bur-
den. This ability to allocate losses, in turn, should substantially
improve the efficiency of the American commercial paper sys-
tem.
230. See Subcomm. on Payments, supra note 196, at 642 n.29.
231. Cf. Price v. Neal, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). Contrast this scenario
of a bank not pursuing a presenter with Price v. Neal. In that case, Price, the
drawee pursued Neale, the presenter for the funds. See id. If Price had pre-
vailed, Neale would have had to return the funds to Price. However, if the
change is made that this article suggests, in the most likely case of a payor
bank allocating the burden with the account holder, the presenter does not
have to return the funds, and the transaction remains final.
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